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Note
BOOTH V MARYLAND-DEATH KNELL FOR THE VICTIM
IMPACT STATEMENT?
In Booth v. Maryland I the Supreme Court of the United States
held unconstitutional the use of victim impact statements in a capital
sentencing proceeding. The Court determined that by introducing
this information the State rendered the sentencing jury's death pen-
alty decision impermissibly arbitrary and capricious. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court did not engage in the traditional systemic ex-
amination typical of previous eighth amendment jurisprudence, but
instead spoke broadly as to philosophic and procedural flaws per-
ceived inherent in the use of victim impact evidence. By so doing,
the Court not only forbade the use of such evidence in death penalty
proceedings, but also raised serious questions as to the future of
victim impact evidence in American criminal law.2
I. THE CASE
In 1983 Booth and an accomplice brutally murdered an elderly
couple, Ira and Rose Bronstein, in their home.' Booth was subse-
quently apprehended, charged, and convicted by a jury of two
counts of first degree murder.4 The State requested the death
I. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
2. The term "victim impact evidence," reflecting the type of information contained
in the Maryland Victim Impact Statement (VIS), encompasses a broad range of factual,
opinion, and documentary evidence. The Court in Booth identified several discrete cate-
gories of such information. See infra Part II. Some types of victim information arguably
are immune from many of the flaws identified in the Court's opinion and this note. For
example, a medical report detailing a victim's physical injuries often is relevant and pro-
bative evidence that can be characterized even under a relatively narrow definition as a
circumstance of the crime, and thus admissible under the rationale of Booth. In this note,
"victim impact evidence" will be used to refer to the more objectionable types of victim
impact evidence identified by the Court, i.e., personal characteristics of the victim, physi-
cal and emotional effects on the victim's family, and the family member's opinions of the
crime.
3. The murderers entered the home intending to rob it. Booth was a neighbor of
the Bronsteins and knew they could identify him. Booth and his accomplice bound and
gagged the victims, and then repeatedly stabbed. each in the chest with a kitchen knife.
107 S. Ct. at 2530. The criminals then left the home, but returned several hours later to
plunder it. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 184, 507 A.2d 1098, 1104 (1986). The Bron-
stein's son discovered the bodies a few days later. 107 S. Ct. at 2530.
4. Booth also was convicted of two counts of robbery and conspiracy to commit
robbery. 107 S. Ct. at 2530. Booth's accomplice, Willie Reid, was convicted and sen-
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penalty.5
Booth elected to be sentenced by a jury.6 During the sentenc-
ing proceeding the State, as required by the Maryland death penalty
statute, introduced into evidence a presentence report compiled by
the Division of Probation and Parole (DPP).7 The report detailed
Booth's background, education and employment history, and crimi-
nal record.8 Because the crime was a felony which caused physical
injury, Maryland law also mandated that the report contain a victim
impact statement (VIS), prepared by the DPP,9 describing the effect
of the crime on the Bronstein family.' 0
In Booth's case the VIS was highly prejudicial. The DPP inter-
viewed several members of the Bronsteins' family, including their
son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter. The report de-
scribed the victims, their life together, and their personal relation-
ships with members of the family. The victims' "outstanding"
tenced to death as a principal in the first degree to the murder of Rose Bronstein. Id. at
2530 n.l. See Reid v. State, 305 Md. 9, 501 A.2d 436 (1985).
5. 107 S. Ct. at 2530.
6. Id. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(b) (1987).
7. 107 S. Ct. at 2530-31. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986).
8. 107 S. Ct. at 2530.
9. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 124 (Supp. 1988) (now codified at art. 41, § 4-609
(1986)). See infra note 29. Although the VIS is compiled by the Division of Probation
and Parole (DPP), the information is supplied by the victim or the victim's family. The
VIS may be read to the jury during the sentencing phase or family members may be
called to testify as to the relevant information. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c)
(1986).
10. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986). A VIS shall:
(i) Identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense;
(iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense
along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relation-
ships as a result of the offense;
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or
the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon
the victim or the victim's family that the court requires.
Id. § 4-609(c)(3). The Booth Court noted that although the Maryland statute does not
expressly permit evidence of a victim's character and community status, the Maryland
Court of Appeals has indicated that such information may be included at the trial judge's
discretion. 107 S. Ct. at 2535 n.9. See Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 820-21, 490 A.2d
1289, 1294 (1985) (no justification for limiting broad discretion of the judge regarding
victim's role in sentencing). Previous VIS's have included this type of information. See
Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 766, 490 A.2d 1228, 1266 (1985) (Cole, J., concurring)
(quoting statement of victim's widow, who declared, "'It hurts when I see other children
with their fathers, knowing that my children don't have a father now who can love and
hold them.").
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personal qualities were emphasized, as was the immediate reaction
of the family members to their murder. The report also related, in
graphic and emotional detail, the impact the tragedy had on each of
the family members' lives."
The son and daughter, for example, told of sleeplessness, de-
pression, painful memories now permanently associated with famil-
iar objects and locations, and a sense of fear coloring their lives.
Both recounted an inability to carry out certain normal activities be-
cause of the association with their parents. Both also expressed hor-
ror at the crime and a keen desire for revenge. 12  The
granddaughter's comments were similar. Among other things she
recounted how the murders had tainted the wedding of another
family member several days later, and how depression and pain have
ruined her own life. 13
!1. 107 S. Ct. at 2536-39. An example includes the son stating that
he can only think of his parents in the context of how he found them that day,
and he can feel their fear and horror. It was 4:00 p.m. when he discovered their
bodies and this stands out in his mind. He is always aware of when 4:00 p.m.
comes each day, even when he is not near a clock. He also wakes up at 4:00
a.m. each morning .... [Hie suffers from lack of sleep. He is unable to drive
on the streets that pass near his parents' home. He also avoids driving past his
father's favorite restaurant, the supermarket where his parents shopped, etc.
He is constantly reminded of his parents. He sees his father coming out of
synagogues, sees his parents' car, and feels very sad whenever he sees old peo-
ple .... [He] feels that his parents were not killed, but were butchered like
animals.
Id. at 2537. Likewise, the daughter related that
[she] and her husband didn't eat dinner for three days following the discovery
of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein's bodies. They cried together every day for four
months and she still cries every day .... [Slhe doesn't sleep through a single
night and thinks a part of her died too when her parents were killed. She re-
ports that she doesn't find much joy in anything and her powers of concentra-
tion aren't good. She feels as if her brain is on overload .... Wherever she
goes she sees and hears her parents. This happens every day. She cannot look
at kitchen knives without being reminded of the murders and she is never away
from it. She . . .can't watch movies with bodies or stabbings in it [sic]. She
can't tolerate any reminder of violence. [She] used to be very trusting, but is
not any longer. When the doorbell rings she tells her husband not to answer it.
She is very suspicious of people and was never that way before .... [H]er
parents were stabbed repeatedly with viciousness and she could never forgive
anyone for killing them that way. She can't believe anybody could do that to
someone... animals wouldn't do this.... She doesn't feel that the people who
did this could ever be rehabilitated and she doesn't want them to be able to do
this again or put another family through this.
Id. at 2538. The entire VIS was reproduced as an appendix to the Court's opinion. Id.
at 2536-39.
12. Id. at 2537-39. The son stated that "he is frightened by his own reaction of what
he would do if someone hurt him or a family member." Id. at 2537-38.
13. Id. at 2538-39.
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The VIS report concluded that the murder of the Bronsteins
was "such a shocking, painful, and devastating memory" to the fam-
ily that it "permeates every aspect of their daily lives. It is doubtful
that they will ever be able to fully recover from this tragedy and not
be haunted by the memory of the brutal manner in which their loved
ones were murdered and taken from them." 1
4
Booth's counsel objected on eighth amendment grounds to the
introduction of the VIS, alleging that the statement was irrelevant
and inflammatory. 5 Consequently, it could lead the jury to impose
the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.' 6 The trial
court admitted the VIS, but granted a defense request that it be read
to the jury instead of introduced through live witnesses.' 7
The jury sentenced Booth to death for the murder of Irvin
Bronstein.' 8 The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, 9 noting that
it had upheld the constitutionality of the VIS in Lodowski v. State.
20
In Lodowski the court concluded that the VIS imparts to the sen-
tencer important information concerning the full measure of harm
caused by the defendant.2 ' In Booth the court found that the VIS
was a "relatively straightforward and factual description of the ef-
fects of these murders on the Bronstein family." 22 The Maryland
court held that the use of the VIS did not render Booth's death sen-
tence improper.
14. Id. at 2539.
15. Id. at 2532.
16. Id. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (finding that jury's discretion
to impose death sentence must be "limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action").
17. 107 S. Ct. at 2532. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (apply-
ing eighth amendment prohibitions to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
18. The jury also sentenced Booth to life imprisonment for the murder of Rose
Bronstein. 107 S. Ct. at 2532.
19. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986). The Maryland capital sen-
tencing scheme requires that the Court of Appeals automatically review all death penalty
convictions. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(a) (1987).
20. 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985). The court held that "there is a reasonable
nexus between the impact of the offense upon the victim or the victim's family and the
facts and circumstances surrounding the crime especially as to the gravity or aggravating
quality of the offense." id. at 741-42, 490 A.2d at 1254.
21. Id. at 742, 490 A.2d at 1254.
22. Booth, 306 Md. at 223, 507 A.2d at 1124. Judge Cole dissented as to the use of
the VIS in sentencing. Id. at 230, 507 A.2d at 1128.
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II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitu-
tional implications of the use of victim impact evidence in a capital
proceeding." Indeed, Booth was the first occasion for the Court to
consider the propriety of victim impact evidence in sentencing.
Booth's situation was the latest manifestation of a victims'
rights movement that has been growing quickly since its inception in
the 1970s.2 4 The main tenets of the victims' rights'movement in-
volve dissatisfaction with the current state of criminal justice. Un-
derlying this dissatisfaction is the perception that the criminal
justice system devotes an inordinate amount of its time and re-
sources to protecting the rights of the criminal defendant while the
victim is ignored.2" The remedy for this preoccupation with the de-
fendant, victims' spokesmen advocate, is an enhanced role for the
victim in the criminal process.26 One outgrowth of this movement
has been the increasing popularity of various forms of victim restitu-
tion as an alternative in criminal sentencing, Another has been the
introduction of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of
criminal trials. 27 As the Court in Booth noted, at least thirty-six
23. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 269 (1986).
24. For a general description of the victims' rights movement, see Carrington &
Nicholson, The Victim's Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, I I PEPPERDINE L. REv. I
(1984) (Symposium Special Issue). For a summary of the current status of the victims'
rights movement, see Johnson, Crime Victims Getting A Day, and a Say, in Court, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 1, 1988, at B7, col. 3.
25. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Booth, pointed to the general frustration of the vic-
tims' rights movement over sentencing procedures and the advent of evidence permit-
ted in mitigation. 107 S. Ct. at 2542. See, e.g., Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights,
37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 948 (1985) ("The 'discovery' of the crime victim provided an
individual to substitute for the state on the side of the scales opposite the accused, thus
making it appear that the balance was more 'equal.' "); Aynes, The Right Not To Be 4
Victim, II PEPPERDINE L. REV. 63, 64 (1984) (Symposium Special Issue) ("[C]oncerns for
victims appear to have originated in modern times as a result of the women's rights
movement and its efforts to protect the welfare of rape victims.").
26. See Johnson, supra note 24. This role can take various forms:
Currently, according to figures from the American Bar Association, seven
states-New York, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, South Carolina, South Da-
kota and West Virginia-have laws requiring consultations with the victim
before a plea is presented to the court by the prosecution. Six other states,
including Connecticut, say the victim has the right to be consulted before the
plea is accepted by the judge. Three states give the victim a right to be in-
formed, but not consulted, about a plea. Thirty-five states allow a victim to be
heard, usually in writing, at the sentencing.
Id.
27. See generally Carrington & Nicholson, supra note 24; Johnson, supra note 24
(briefly describing the victims' rights movement's legislative efforts). The victims' rights
movement has spawned numerous proposals for legislative reform. See, e.g., AMERICAN
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states now permit the use of some form of victim impact evidence in
sentencing proceedings. 2
In Maryland victim impact evidence is contained in a VIS. 29 The
BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE FAIR TREATMENT OF VICTIMS AND WITNESSES IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1983). ABA Guideline II provides that "prior to the
sentencing of anoffender in a serious case, victims or their representatives should have
the opportunity to inform the sentencing body of the crime's physical, psychological,
and financial repercussions on the victim's family." The guidelines list several alterna-
tive methods for such information to be considered, including written statements pre-
pared by the victim and the victim's family, a statement prepared by a probation officer,
or oral testimony.
Other reform efforts have focused on restitution for the crime victim, statutory
requirements of notice to the victim at various stages of the criminal process, and
preventing the enrichment of criminals at the expense of victims (Son of Sam Laws). See
Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time for a Change, I I PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 23, 47-51, 55-57 (1984) (Symposium Special Issue). Of all recent reform efforts,
however, "none has been as quickly accepted as the use of'victim impact statements.'"
Id at 51.
28. 107 S. Ct. at 2536 n.12. Many of the state victim impact schemes are similar to
that enacted by Maryland. For a summary of state legislation codifying victim impact
evidence, see the Appendix infra at 733.
Certain states guarantee the victim or immediate family the opportunity to person-
ally address the sentencing court. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-91a(c) (1985)
(crime victim has right to testify at the sentencing hearing); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.143
(1985) (victim, or next of kin if victim has died as a result of the crime, may make an oral
or written statement to the court). Most of those states recognizing a sentencing role for
victim impact evidence have statutory provisions requiring a victim impact statement or
victim impact evidence to be submitted as part of the presentence report for criminal
offenders. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.022 (1984). Many of these state schemes allow
the sentencing authority to consider the same broad categories of information as that
included in the Maryland VIS. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.051 (Supp. 1985).
Indeed, several states have victim impact statements virtually identical to Maryland's.
See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-102 (1986).
There are a number of procedural variations. Some states differentiate between
felony and misdemeanor offenses, either limiting victim impact evidence to felony cases
or requiring it for felonies and permitting it on an optional basis in misdemeanors. See,
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4604(2) (Supp. 1985) (presentence report, containing attitude
of victim or complainant concerning the crime, required for felonies and optional for
misdemeanors). Several states specifically exclude victim impact evidence from capital
cases. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 279, § 4B (Supp. 1988). Most allow the specific
content of the victim impact evidence to be determined by a parole department or simi-
lar agency. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.145 (1986).
Further examples of state victim impact evidence legislation are provided in the
Appendix. The federal government also has instituted reforms as a result of pressure
from the victims' rights lobby. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982).
29. In 1982 the Maryland General Assembly enacted legislation requiring that
presentence investigation reports include a victim impact statement if (I) the defendant,
in committing a felony, caused physical, psychological, or economic injury; or (2) the
defendant, in committing a misdemeanor, caused serious physical injury or death to the
victim. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 124 (Supp. 1984) (now codified at art. 41, § 4-609
(1986)).
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VIS is a mandatory part of the presentence investigation in felonies
that cause physical, psychological or economic injury, and in misde-
meanors that cause serious physical injury or death.3 0 The VIS is
compiled by the DPP based on interviews with the victim, family
members, probation officer, and other concerned individuals. By
statute, the DPP must report economic loss, physical injury, changes
in personal and family situations, requests for psychiatric services by
the victim or family members, and "any other information related to
the impact of the offense upon the victim or the victim's family that
the court requires."'"
Maryland law specifically requires that a VIS be prepared in
capital cases.3 2 Victim impact evidence is not listed as a statutory
aggravating factor in the Maryland death penalty statute, ss but it is
mandatory that a presentence report, containing the VIS, be intro-
duced for the sentencing authority's consideration. s4
The immediate question before the Supreme Court in Booth was
whether the Constitution permits the consideration of victim impact
evidence by a capital sentencingjury. Booth contended that consid-
ering this type of information would lead to arbitrary or capricious
sentencing. This result would be unconstitutional. Since 1972,
commencing with Furman v. Georgia," the Court has required state
death penalty schemes to conform to the dictates of the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. A
state must structure its capital sentencing process to ensure that the
imposition of the state's ultimate punishment accords with society's
"evolving standards of decency."" 6 Thus, a state may no longer in-
30. Id.
31. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986).
32. In 1983 the Maryland General Assembly enacted the following provision:
In any case in which the death penalty is requested.. . a presentence investiga-
tion, including a victim impact statement, shall be completed by the Division of
Parole and Probation, and shall be considered by the court or jury before
whom the separate sentencing proceeding is conducted ....
Id. § 4-609(d).
33. For a defendant to qualify for capital punishment, the sentencing authority must
find at least one statutory aggravating factor. The statutory aggravating factors are con-
tained in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d) (1987). Mitigating factors also are listed. Id.
§ 413(g). To impose a sentence of death, Maryland law requires that the sentencing
authority find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones. Id. § 413(h).
34. See supra note 32.
35. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280. 302 (1976)
("[C]entral to the limited holding in Furman was the conviction that the vesting of
standardless sentencing power in the jury violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
36. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
19881 707
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flict the death penalty in a freakish or wanton manner. Sentencing
must "be, or appear to be, based on reason, rather than caprice or
emotion." s3 7 Constitutionally, it cannot be arbitrary.
This rationale is particularly relevant when a jury sentences the
defendant. The death penalty is the ultimate expression of a "soci-
ety's moral outrage."-3 8 To properly measure this sentiment, the
Court has spokenapprovingly of the use of ajury as the sentencing
authority in capital cases.3 ' The jury is a direct representative of
community values.4" Yet crucial to the Court's evaluation of the
constitutionality of a state statutory scheme is the requirement that a
sentencing jury's discretion be "suitably directed and limited so as
to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."' 4 ,
The jury must reach an "individualized" decision based on the de-
fendant's characteristics and the circumstances of the crime.42 Con-
sequently, although a typical sentencing authority has unrestricted
access to a wide range of information, without regard to the eviden-
tiary concerns of the guilt-or-innocence phase of a trial,43 the infor-
mation available to a capital sentencing jury may be constitutionally
circumscribed.4 4
37. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
38. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ).
39. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,469-71 (1984) (Stevens,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Uluries are better equipped than judges to make capital
sentencing decisions.").
40. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181, 190 ("[T]hejury... is a significant and reliable objec-
tive index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved."); Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n. 15 (1968) (function of the sentencing jury is to "express
the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death," a "link be-
tween contemporary community values and the penal system"). Despite its perceived
advantages, the Court has held that jury sentencing for capital crimes is not constitution-
ally required. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 447. The Court also has maintained that "even if it is
a jury that imposes the sentence, the 'community's voice' is not given free rein. The
community's voice is heard at least as clearly in the legislature when the death penalty is
authorized and the particular circumstances in which death is appropriate are defined."
Id. at 462.
41. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plural-
ity) (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("[Ilf a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a
constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbi-
trary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.").
42. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983).
43. See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1978) (" '[Tihe hearsay rule may not
be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends ofjustice.' " (quoting Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973))); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245-47 (1949)
(sentencing judge not bound by strict rules of evidence or confrontation). In Maryland,
for example, a sentencing judge is "vested with virtually boundless discretion." Logan
v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480, 425 A.2d 632, 642 (1981).
44. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985) ("[M]any of the limits that
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III. THE COURT'S DECISION
The Court in Booth found that the information contained in the
VIS was irrelevant to a jury's " 'individualized determination' of
whether the defendant in question should be executed." 4 The
Court reached this conclusion by examining the intrinsic value of
victim impact evidence, rejecting dissent and state arguments that
such information can be classified, in reality, as a "circumstance of
the crime." 46
The Court began by acknowledging deference to a legislative
determination of proper sentencing considerations.47 Despite this
deference, the legislative scheme must give way when constitutional
concerns are implicated.48 The eighth amendment in particular was
intended as a protective measure against the abuse of legislative
power.49 As noted above, the Court has determined that the eighth
amendment requires that a capital sentencing decision be an "indi-
vidualized determination."5 Thus, judicial scrutiny is particularly
needed when a state capital sentencing statute requires the consid-
eration of factors not directly related to the individual defendant's
"personal responsibility and moral guilt." 5'
this Court has placed on the imposition of capital punishment are rooted in a concern
that the sentencing process should facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sen-
tencing discretion.").
45. 107 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (empha-
sis in original)).
46. Id.
47. Id. The dissent argued that such deference should be decisive. Id. at 2539
(White, J., dissenting) (" '(]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are consti-
tuted to respond to the will of the people.'" (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
175 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, 1J.))). See also Pennsylvania ex rel
Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) ("[T]he comparative gravity of criminal offenses
and whether their consequences are more or less injurious are matters for [legislative]
determination."). But see infra note 48.
48. As the plurality noted in Gregg: "Although legislative measures adopted by the
people's chosen representatives provide one important means of ascertaining contem-
porary values, it is evident that legislative judgments alone cannot be determinative of
Eighth Amendment standards since that Amendment was intended to safeguard individ-
uals from the abuse of legislative power." 428 U.S. at 174 n.19.
49. Id.
50. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (emphasis in original). See supra note
41 and accompanying text.
51. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). The Court did note that it never
has exclusively limited permissible sentencing factors to the defendant's characteristics,
record, and the circumstances of the crime. 107 S. Ct. at 2532. Indeed, the Court has
previously stated that "the Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possi-
ble ... factors" in capital sentencing decisions. Zant, 462 U.S. at 878. The Court's
reasoning suggests, however, that any future departure from these capital sentencing
fundamentals will be subjected to fairly strict scrutiny. The rigorousness of such an
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The State argued that such scrutiny was unnecessary. The use
of the VIS at capital sentencing, in the State's view, does not lead to
an arbitrary or capricious death penalty decision. There is a "direct,
foreseeable nexus" between the crime and the physical, emotional,
and social harm inflicted upon the victims and their families. 52
Knowledge of the full extent of the harm allows the jury to better
assess the " 'gravity or aggravating quality' " of the offense.53
The Court rejected this generalized characterization of the VIS.
Instead, it examined the specific nature of the information con-
tained in the VIS to determine its relevancy to the capital sentencing
decision. The Court divided the VIS into two types of information:
(1) a description of the emotional trauma suffered by the.family and
the personal characteristics of the victims; and (2) the family mem-
bers' opinions and characterizations of the crimes.54 Discussing
each category in turn, the Court identified substantive and proce-
dural flaws that rendered both types of evidence inadmissible for
capital sentencing purposes.
A. Moral Culpability
The Court devoted the majority of its opinion to the first cate-
gory of victim impact information. 55 The State argued that this type
of evidence-the personal characteristics of the victims and the
trauma inflicted by their loss-is a relevant measure of the gravity of
the offender's crime.56 The Court, however, rejected such a stan-
examination may even approach that reserved for suspect class equal protection analysis
under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)
(racial classifications are subject "to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional
muster, they must be justified by a compelling government interest").
52. 107 S. Ct. at 2533.
53. Brief for Respondent at 21 (quoting Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 741-42, 490
A.2d 1228, 1254 (1985)). By its characterization of victim impact evidence as indicative
of the "aggravating quality" of the offense, the State offered an opportunity for defeat-
ing the Maryland statute on procedural grounds. Maryland arguably has limited the
jury's consideration of major "aggravating" factors, or at least those bearing an official
imprimatur, to those enumerated in the statute. By injecting an element that conced-
edly is aggravating into the sentencing decision, in a form calculated to inspire defer-
ence on the part of the jury, yet without the defined role of the statutory aggravating
factors, the State rendered the jury's decision unguided, undirected and, hence, uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary. It should be noted that the statutory aggravating factors must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1987).
54. 107 S. Ct. at 2533.
55. Id. at 2533-35. The first type of information has an arguably closer connection to
the State's circumstantial "nexus." The second type, evidently in the perception of both
parties, has a far weaker legal foundation, and thus was accorded a proportionally
smaller share of the argument.
56. Id. at 2533.
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dard for capital sentencing purposes.
5 7
Initially the Court considered the constitutional basis of the
capital sentencing process. To conform to the eighth amendment
proscription of arbitrariness, the sentencing jury must consider all
relevant information and render an "individualized" sentencing de-
cision. The broad scope of such an examination does not, however,
extend to evidence that is misleading or irrelevant.: The fatal flaw of
the VIS, according to the Court, was that the included information
did not directly relate to the moral blameworthiness of the individ-
ual defendant.5 "
By its very nature, the focus of the VIS is on the victim. The
information it contains may be completely unknown or unantici-
pated at the time the defendant commits the crime. As the Court
pointed out, "defendants rarely select their victims based on
whether the murder will have an effect on anyone other than the
person murdered."5 9 A defendant's culpability should depend on
"circumstances over which he has control."6 ° It is generally ac-
cepted that the intended consequences of a defendant's act extend
only to those results the defendant desires or is substantially certain
will occur.6 These circumstances do not include the personal his-
tory and characteristics of the victim, or the amount of grief inflicted
upon the victim's family.62 Thus, in most cases a VIS describes only
the indirect consequences of a crime.63 In the view of the Court, such
a questionable extension of liability is impermissible in a capital sen-
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2534. The Court stated that "[wihile the full range of foreseeable conse-
quences of a defendant's actions may be relevant in other criminal and civil contexts, we
cannot agree that it is relevant in the unique circumstances of a capital sentencing hear-
ing," Id. at 2533.
59. d. at 2534.
60. Id. at 2534 n.7 (quoting People v. Levitt, 156 Cal. App. 3d 500, 516, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 276, 287 (1984)). The Supreme Court endorsed the following quotation from
Levitt:
"We think it obvious that a defendant's level of culpability depends not on for-
tuitous circumstances such as the composition of his victim's family, but on
circumstances over which he has control. A defendant may choose, or decline,
to premeditate, to act callously, to attack a vulnerable victim, to commit a crime
while on probation, or to amass a record of offenses .... In contrast, the fact
that a victim's family is irredeemably bereaved can be attributable to no act of
will of the defendant other than his commission of homicide in the first place.
Such bereavement is relevant to damages in a civil action, but it has no relation-
ship to the proper purposes of sentencing in a criminal case."
Id. (quoting Levitt, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 516-17, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88).
61. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw § 28, at 196 (1972).
62. Id.
63. Indeed, equating victim impact evidence with the "circumstances of the crime"
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tencing context."
Booth's offense was the taking of a human life. A capital sen-
tencing decision is based on determining which defendants who
commit that offense qualify for society's ultimate sanction. The de-
fendants are distinguished by the amount of their individual moral
blame. Each defendant's "punishment must be tailored to his per-
sonal responsibility and moral guilt."'65 Information which is not
probative to that decision is irrelevant. 66 Its admission would defeat
the constitutional mandate of guided sentencing discretion.
JUstices White and Scalia dissented. They strongly disagreed
with the majority's definition of the proper limits of sentencing con-
siderations.6 7 Capital punishment is the ultimate sanction for an af-
front to humanity. 68 This affront, they reasoned, is not limited to
the victim; it includes repercussions on family, friends, and society
as a whole. Thus, in the dissent's view, the full extent of the harm
caused by Booth is germane to deciding his appropriate
punishment.
After all, Justice White noted, if a motorist runs a stoplight and
kills someone, the punishment is far greater than if the motorist
merely had run the light without injury, yet the moral culpability is
the same.69 In previous cases the Court has indicated that the harm
caused by an offense may be the basis for punishment, even if the
offender lacked specific intent."° Indeed, as Justice Scalia pointed
has been described as "pure sophistry." Moore v. Zant, 722 F.2d 640, 653 n.3 (I Ith Cir.
1983) (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. But see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(objecting to the engrafting of an intent requirement onto the eighth amendment and
constitutional law).
65. Id. at 801.
66. See, e.g., Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 828, 218 S.E.2d 612,614 (1975) (hold-
ing that a murder victim's character generally is irrelevant and inadmissible in murder
trial); People v.Jordan, 38 Ill. 2d 83, 91.230 N.E.2d 161, 166 (1967) ("[Elvidence that a
murder victim has left a spouse or children is inadmissible since it does not enlighten the
trier of fact as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant or as to the punishment he
should receive, but only serves to prejudice and inflame the jury"); Fisher v. State, 481
So. 2d 203, 225 (Miss. 1985) (en banc) (holding that a murder victim's character gener-
ally is irrelevant and inadmissible in a murder trial).
67. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O'Connor, and Justice Scalia joined. 107 S. Ct. at 2539. Justice Scalia also filed a dis-
senting opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice O'Connor
joined. Id. at 2541.
68. Id. at 2539 (White, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2540.
70. Id. at 2540 n.l. Justice White cited as an example United States v. Feola, 420
U.S. 671 (1975), in which the Court held that conviction under 18 U.S.C. § Ill for
assault upon a federal officer does not require proof that the defendant knew the vic-
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out, when the intent is the same the amount of harm caused may
bear on the extent of personal responsibility, as in the dichotomy
between attempted murder and murder.7 ' The goal of truly "indi-
vidualized" punishment thus should allow the State to include as a
capital sentencing consideration the particularized harm caused by
an individual murder."
In addition, the dissent identified a legitimate state interest in
offsetting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is allowed to
introduce, "to lay before the sentencing authority the full reality of
human suffering the defendant has produced. ' 7'  To do otherwise
would permit "a debate on the appropriateness of the capital pen-
alty with one side muted.17 4
Although there is some intuitive appeal to the dissent's posi-
tion, it is philosophically flawed and Unsupported by previous
Supreme Court jurisprudence. It is a basic tenet of American crimi-
nal jurisprudence that the degree of criminal culpability depends on
the degree of a defendant's moral guilt.7 5 A defendant's intention in
performing proscribed acts plays a critical role in the affixing of
criminal blame. 6 Consequently, "[ilt is fundamental that 'causing
harm intentionally [should] be punished more severely than causing
the same harm unintentionally.' ",77 Penalties have been invalidated
as "unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of intentional wrong-
doing."178 For example, it is unconstitutional to make narcotics ad-
diction a crime.79 In addition, the Court has invalidated a capital
punishment scheme based on the existence of an aggravating cir-
tim's status. Justice White's reliance on Feola is misplaced. The Court in Feola went to
great lengths to determine that the victim's federal status was intended as a jurisdic-
tional requirement, not an indicator of aggravation in the offense. Id. at 676-77. See Ex
parte Murry, 455 So. 2d 72 (Ala. 1984) (declaring that to convict defendant of capital
offense of killing a police officer, jury must find that defendant knew victim was a peace
officer on duty). See aLso id. at 77-78 (collecting cases; of 32 states with similar statutes,
only Missouri has ruled that no requirement of knowledge will be inferred).
71. Id. at 2541.
72. Id. at 2540. Such an argument is not new. See'Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
815 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (in reaching a capital sentencing decision, sen-
tencing authority should look not only to the culpability of the defendant, but also to the
degree of harm inflicted on the victim).
73. 107 S. Ct. at 2542 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. "American criminal law has long considered a defendant's intention-and there-
fore his moral guilt-to be critical to 'the degree'of his criminal culpability.' " Enmund,
458 U.S. at 800 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 798 (quoting H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 162 (1968)).
78. Id. at 800.
79. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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cumstance which did not reflect "a consciousness materially more
'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder."'8
The Court has continually maintained that the capital sentenc-
ing authority must consider the "relevant facets of the character and
record of the individual offender."8' In essence, the crucial ques-
tion in the sentencing decision is the determination of the individual
defendant's culpability.8 " In Enmund v. Florida,"3 for example, the
Court invalidated the death penalty for a defendant, convicted
under a felony murder provision, who did not kill or attempt to
kill.8
4
The ultimate moral issue for a defendant charged with murder
is the killing of another human being. "Unintended physical, emo-
tional and psychological after-effects" do not increase the defend-
ant's moral blame "beyond the onus he already bears for
committing the murder."8 .5 Such results are constitutionally irrele-
vant in the Court's view.
To some degree the physical and emotional havoc wrought by a
particular offense-lends greater weight to the societal need for pun-
ishment.8 6 In most instances, however, these effects are a standard
component of the- sentencing calculus. The loss murder inflicts
upon society is one of the reasons murder is accorded such a severe
punishment. After all, "common sense tells us that murder victims
do not live in a vacuum and that, in most cases, they leave behind
family members."187 To move beyond this generic societal impact,
however, requires the offender to answer for particularized conse-
quences that are unanticipated and thus unrelated to any additional
increment of blameworthiness.
That is not to say that certain consequences of a defendant's
80. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
81. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Pow-
ell, and Stevens, JJ.).
82. Sentencing schemes which materially limit this examination have been found
constitutionally defective. For example, in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), a plu-
rality of the Court invalidated a capital sentencing scheme which provided too limited a
range of mitigating factors, in particular excluding consideration of the amount of per-
sonal involvement in the crime.
83. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
84. Id. at 801. But see Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987) (defendant still can
receive death penalty if death is an easily foreseeable consequence of his actions).
85. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. In Sup-
port of Petitioner at 17.
86. As Justice Scalia stated, this is "one of the reasons society deems his act worthy
of the prescribed penalty." 107 S. Ct. at 2542 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. People v. Free, 94 ItI. 2d 378, 415, 477 N.E.2d 218, 236 (1983).
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actions may not bear -on the sentencing decision. In Tison v. Ari-
zona,88 cited by both the majority and the dissent, the Court allowed
the death sentence to stand for a defendant who participated in the
prison breakout of his father, a known murderer. During the course
of the escape, his father murdered three people whom the defend-
ant had assisted in kidnapping. The Court held that a defendant's
degree of knowledge of the probable consequences of his or her
actions may increase moral culpability in a constitutionally signifi-
cant manner.
89
In some instances, the information contained in the VIS may
actually relate to culpability. For example, under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, it is permissible to show the peaceable nature of the
victim to rebut evidence offered by the defendant to prove that the
victim was the aggressor. 9°  . ,
In most cases, however, the VIS does not add to a reasoned
sentencing decision. It plays no historically accepted role in the
capital sentencing process. On the other hand, it is potentially mis-
leading, imparting an aggravating character to factors which are ir-
relevant to that life or death decision. Consequently, the VIS should
be excluded from the sentencing authority's consideration.
The Court's death penalty jurisprudence, after all, has always
centered around the proposition that "[tihere must be a valid peno-
logical reason for choosing from among the many criminal defend-
ants the few who are sentenced to death."'" It has been established
that the principal goals of capital punishment are retribution and
deterrence. 92 Both are inextricably linked to the degree of a crimi-
nal's culpability. 93 If a given punishment does not enhance a proper
88. 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987).
89. The Court distinguished the situation in Tison from Enmund, in which the defend-
ant's participation in the subject murder was much more tangential. Tison does not, as
the dissent implied, abandon the sentencing focus on moral culpability. Indeed, the
Court stated that the "'heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must
be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender." Tison, 107 S. Ct.
at 1683.
90. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
91. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 n.7 (1984).
92. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.). Rehabilitation and incapacitation, the two other accepted components of
criminal sentencing, are not furthered by the imposition of the death penalty. Spaziano,
468 U.S. at 477-78 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even if they
were, these considerations depend even more intimately on an assessment of the de-
fendant's individual culpability.
93. Though this is perhaps obvious in the case of deterrence, see, e.g., Enmund, 458
U.S. at 799 ("[]f a person does not intend that life be taken . .. the possibility that the
death penalty will be imposed . . . will not enter into the 'cold calculus that precedes the
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sentencing goal, "it is nothing more than the purposeless and need-
less infliction of pain and suffering."94 As such, it is constitutionally
excessive, cruel and unusual punishment.9"
Of course, the most compelling response to the arguments of
the dissent and the State is that "death is a punishment different
from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree. ' ' 96 As such, the
Court has recognized that there is a corresponding need for greater
indicia of reliability in the death penalty decision.97 As Justice
Blackmun has said, this need "is as firmly established as any in our
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."9 " Indeed, the Court has gone
decision to act.'" (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186)), it is less so when considering retri-
bution. The death penalty, after all, is in part an "expression of society's moral outrage
at particularly offensive conduct." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, quoted in Booth v. State, 306
Md. 172, 223, 507 A.2d 1098, 1124 (1986). Yet it seems clear that this outrage must be
tempered with objectivity, lest it hamper fair and impartial sentencing, reducing the
punishment process to one of private vengeance and retaliation. See Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 344-45 (1972) (MarshallJ., concurring); Booth v. State, 306 Md. at 234,
507 A.2d at 1130 (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Retribution, though it'may provide the initial impetus to remedy criminal infrac-
tions, cannot "become the State's sole end in punishing." Furman, 408 U.S. at 343 (Mar-
shall,J., concurring). It is not an unlimited license to punish at will. As Justice Marshall
has stated, "If retribution alone could serve as a justification for any particular penalty,
then all penalties selected by the legislature would by definition be acceptable means for
designating society's moral approbation of a particular act." Id. at 344. Criminal juris-
prudence has evolved beyond such atavistic motivations. See id. at 343 (" 'The purpose
of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties ofjust, not tormenting, sever-
ity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal.'"
(quoting Weems v. United States,'217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910)) (emphasis omitted)).
The purpose of criminal punishment is to vindicate the interests of society as a
whole, not the individual victim. To gauge the extent of the criminal's public offense, it
is essential to examine the individual defendant's culpability. See Tison v. Arizona, 107
S. Ct. 1676, 1683 (1987) (heart of retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must
be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant). But see Brooks v. Kemp,
762 F.2d 1383, 1410 (11 th Cir. 1985) (reference to the loss suffered by the victim's
family is "no more than a compelling statement of the victim's death and its significance,
relevant to the retributive function of the death penalty").
94. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
95. Id. In addition, a more expansive reading of the deterrence and retribution ra-
tionale inevitably blurs the distinction between tort and crime. Crime, unlike tort, is a
public, not a private wrong. Different interests are affected and different remedies af-
forded. See W. PRossER, D. DosBs, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984).
96. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, .J.).
97. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,998-99 (1983); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. The
nonavailability of corrective or modifying measures (e.g., parole, probation, post-convic-
tion remedies) as a corrective remedy to an executed death sentence underscores the
need for reliability in the capital sentencing decision. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605
(1978) (Burger, C.J.).
98. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 924 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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to "extraordinary measures" to ensure that the-process does not
permit the death penalty to be "imposed out of whim, passion, prej-
udice or mistake." 99
To guard against an arbitrary and capricious decision the Court
has insisted that the discretion of the sentencing jury must be di-
rected and channeled. °0 0 Marginally relevant information that is
overly prejudicial, inflammatory, or confusing may be eliminated.
The Court thus has limited the jury's consideration to the character-
istics and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the
crime. In distinguishing murder from attempted murder, or vehicu-
lar manslaughter from a traffic violation, the harm caused is a direct,
statutorily quantifiable circumstance of the crime, one that the jury
easily can grasp. Even if victim impact information is tangentially
related to the circumstances of the crime, its tenuous connection to
the individual defendant's blameworthiness, and its inflammatory
nature, compounded by the procedural problems noted below, do
not comport with the stringent safeguards imposed by the Court on
capital sentencing.
In Booth the principal "circumstances of the crime" were the
brutal deaths of Irvin and Rose Bronstein, not the continuing emo-
tional problems or the desire for vengeance of surviving family
members, as compelling as they may be. Although such factors ad-
mittedly are related to the crime, they are unquantifiable and do not
enhance the ability of the sentencing authority to arrive at a consid-
ered judgment. As Judge Cole, of the Maryland Court of Appeals,
said in his Booth opinion, the only function served by the testimony
of the victim's family is to " 'exacerbate the aggravating circum-
stances already established by the prosecution.' "' The unguided
and irrational emotional responses that Victim impact evidence of
99. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (discussing importance to the defend-
ant that imposition of sentence "appear to be based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion").
100. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.) ("[T]he requirements of Furman are satisfied when the sentencing author-
ity's discretion is guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that
argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, thus eliminating total arbi-
trariness and capriciousness in its imposition."). See also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 427-29 (1980) (plurality) (reversing death sentence because the aggravating cir-
cumstance relied upon by the jury was not so tailored as to avoid arbitrary and capri-
cious sentencing).
101. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 240-41, 507 A.2d 1098, 1133 (1986) (quoting
Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 786, 490 A.2d 1228, 1276 (1985)).
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this sort is calculated to elicit are hard pressed to conform to any
concept of heightened reliability in sentencing.
B. Evidentiary and Procedural Problems
The Court determined that the second flaw of victim impact evi-
dence was the evidentiary and procedural problems connected with
its use. As noted above, to ensure that capital sentencing is indeed
imposed on the basis of "reason rather than caprice or emotion,"
the Court has ,not hesitated to invalidate "procedural rules that
tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determina-
tion."". In Booth the Court determined that the evidence contained
ii the VIS was not only unreliable, but irrelevant as well.
The Bronstein family was articulate, even eloquent, in expres-
sing its grief. This will not always be the case. Some victims, as the
Court noted, will have an inarticulate family or will not leave a fam-
ily at all. I0" The emotional impact of a death always is severe. A
violent, unexpected death is particularly wrenching. In the Court's
view, however, the ability of a family to express its grief is irrelevant
to the sentencing decision. 0 4
A potentially more serious issue is the amount of information
encompassed by the dissent's expansive definition of harm. Widely
disparate categories of information are contained in the VIS. Physi-
cal injury and psychological damage arguably may be connected to
the actions of the defendant. But are the victim's personal charac-
teristics proximately related to the defendant's crime?' If indica-
tive of "harm," the community is in essence classifying victims on a
102. Beck v. Alabama,.447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980).
103. 107 S. Ct. at 2534. The practical result is that the killer of a person with an
educated family will be put to death, while the killer of a person with an uneducated
family or no family at all may be spared. Booth, 306 Md. at 233, 507 A.2d at 1129 (Cole,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 0
104. Justice White in dissent attempted to refute this argument by compaing the dif-
fering abilities of any two prosecutors or any two witnesses. 107 S. Ct. at 2540-41
(White, J., dissenting). An institutional defect, however, does not need to be
exacerbated.
105. Historically, the answer to such a question usually has been "no." See, e.g., Hen-
derson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 828, 218 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1975) (evidence of murder
victim's family situation inadmissible); People v. Holman, 103 I11. 2d 133, 167-68, 469
N.E.2d 119, 135, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1984) (death sentence vacated when prose-
cution alluded to the "religious moral fiber" of the victim's mother as well as the accom-
plishments of the victim); People v. Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 453, 457 N.E.2d 31, 37
(1983) (evidence of murder victim's family situation inadmissible); Fisher v. State, 482
So. 2d 203, 235 (Miss. 1985) (en banc) (murder victim's character generally irrelevant
and inadmissible in a murder trial).
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scale of societal worth." °6 The logical extension of this view would
require the death of a loving father or mother to be punished more
severely than that of a homeless orphan. 0 7 The real difficulty arises
when any attempt is made to construct an outer limit to such evi-
dence. Is economic information relevant? Are social position and
class?' °8 The Court does not explore these alternatives, but instead
rejects such information in toto as " 'a principled way to distinguish
[cases] in which the death penalty should be imposed, from the
many cases in which it was not.' "'09
This type of evidence also is plagued by procedural difficulties.
The capital sentencing process almost invariably is adversarial in na-
ture. Yet, the Court found, victim impact evidence is peculiarly un-
susceptible to rebuttal. It would be "difficult-if not impossible" to
106. Justice Scalia, in dissent, implied that society can consider the victim's character
and status as evidence of the amount of harm caused by the criminal acts of the defend-
ant. 107 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court, on the other hand, seem-
ingly endorsed the reasoning of Judge Cole of the Maryland Court of Appeals, who
stated that "the ultimate crime is the taking of a life, and there can be no further mea-
surement as to the value of the life taken." Booth, 306 Md. at 233, 507 A.2d at 1129.
Nevertheless, in Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 (1977), the Court declared that
the fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular duties could be
regarded as a proper aggravating circumstance in a capital sentencing scheme. The
Louisiana statute at issue in Roberts, however, required a specific intent and knowledge
of the victim's status. Id. at 639-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. But see Grant v. State, 703 P.2d 943, 945-46 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (prosecu-
tor's statement that the victim was survived by an 1 I-year-old daughter held error, but
harmless).
108. And consider the logical but unmentionable extension of this line of evidence-
the victim's sex and race. The State suggests that concerns about racial bias can be
allayed by a more rigorous voir dire of the jury. Brief for the Respondent at 37. Such a
remedy would appear inadequate, however, to preserve constitutional safeguards
against discriminatory sentencing, particularly when the concerns are raised by the spe-
cific procedural process adopted by the State. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885
(1983) (sentencing scheme would be invalid if a state "attached the 'aggravating' label to
factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing pro-
cess, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant.");
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas,J, concurring) ("[D]eath penalty
inflicted on one. defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his
race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that
gives room for the play of such prejudices.").
109. 107 S. Ct. at 2534 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (opin-
ion of Stewart, J.)). The Court noted that it was "troubled by the implication that de-
fendants whose victims were assets to their community are more deserving of
punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy. Of course, our
system of justice does not tolerate such distinctions." 107 S. Ct. at 2534 n.8. Indeed,
one of the principal purposes of controlling jury discretion is to prevent the discrimina-
tory application of capital punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204
S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974).
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provide the defense a fair opportunity to contradict the information
being offered by the state.t"0 Due process seemingly would afford
the defense a right to cross-examine and introduce witnesses, but,
the Court reasoned, these alternatives are hardly fair or palatable. " '
Tactically, it is hard to irihagine when cross-examining the victim's
family would not be counterproductive, evoking antipathy towards
the defendant or counsel. Indeed, such measures may be futile.
Rarely can it be shown that grieving family members have exagger-
ated emotional trauma, depression, fear, or anxiety.' 2
The introduction of defense witnesses to impeach family mem-
bers is perhaps even more odious. In addition to the strategic risks
in attacking the victim's character in front of the jury, the introduc-
tion of evidence of dubious morals or unpopularity can result in a
"minitrial" on the victim's character. As the Court noted, this is
"more than simply unappealing"; it could distract the jury from con-
stitutionally proper sentencing considerations-the background and
record of the accused and the circumstances of the crime."13
C. Family Member Opinion Testimony
The Court also found family members' opinions and characteri-
zations of the crime, the second category of information contained
in the VIS, impermissibly distracting. It is arguable that such infor-
mation is the legally weakest form of victim impact evidence, its con-
nection to a dispassionate analysis of the effects of a crime the most
tenuous. In this instance, the Bronsteins' son and daughter ex-
pressed horror at the crime and a desire for revenge. The son, for
example, stated that his parents were "butchered like animals" and
that the defendant should not "get away with it.""' 4 The daughter
expressed disbelief and stated that she "could never forgive anyone
for killing [her parents] that way." She continued, "[A]nimals
wouldn't do this. [They] didn't have to kill because there was no
one to stop them from looting .... The murders show the vicious-
ness of the killers' anger." Moreover, "[sihe doesn't feel that the
110. 107 S. Ct. at 2535.
111. Id. Set Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (opinion of Stevens,J.) (due
process requires defendant be given opportunity to rebut presentence report).
112. 107 S. Ct. at 2535.
113. Id. Justice White, in the dissent's sole reply to the procedural problems of rebut-
tal raised by the majority, labelled such concerns "speculative." Id. at 2541. In reality it
is speculative that such concerns would not arise, unless the victim was a social outcast,
without family or position. The dissenters did not respond to overall questions of fun-
damental fairness and due process impliedly raised by the majority opinion.
114. Id. at 2535-36.
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people who did this could ever be rehabilitated and she doesn't
want them to be able to do this again or put another family through
this."' 15
Although the Court acknowledged the family's genuine grief
and anger, it held that the formal presentation of such information
can "serve no other purpose" than to inflame the jury and to divert
its attention from the "relevant" evidence concerning the defendant
and the crime.' 16
IV. THE ROLE OF THE VIS AFTER BOOTH
Booth stands for the proposition that victim impact evidence, at
least in the form adopted within the Maryland sentencing statute, is
a constitutionally impermissible consideration in a capital sentenc-
ing proceeding. The Court was undoubtedly correct in this deter-
mination. The entire thrust of eighth amendment jurisprudence has
been to avoid ihe infliction of arbitrary or excessive penalties. To
achieve this objective, capital sentencing authorities traditionally
have focused on the background and record of the defendant and
the circumstances of the cnime."' Any departure from this rule
must be handled in such a manner that the sentencing authority's
discretion is suitably guided and directed."' Otherwise, unfettered
discretion, coupled with the consideration of information not di-
115. Id. at 2536 (quoting victim impact statement).
116. Id. at 2535-36. This view has been adopted elsewhere. See, e.g., People v. Free,
94 I1. 2d 378, 436, 447 N.E.2d 218, 246 (1983) (Simon, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("It would be difficult to find anything less relevant to the circumstances
of this offense or the character of this defendant than testimony concerning the reac-
tions of family members of his unfortunate victims."); Fuselier v. State, 468 So. 2d 45
(Miss. 1985) (reversing death penalty conviction because victim's daughter was permit-
ted to sit near the prosecutor and openly display emotion).
Justice White confronted.this argument by attacking the underlying proposition-
that the loss which the survivors suffered is irrelevant to sentencing. Assuming arguendo
that this information is relevant, the evidence remains overly inflammatory. See, e.g.,
Welty v. State, 402 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 1981) (preference for nonfamily member
testimony, whenever possible, to identify the deceased); Free, 94 Ill. 2d at 436, 447
N.E.2d at 254 (Simon, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("An emotional
rendition of the grief of a victim's family, while understandable, can only distract the
jury .... "); State v. Sprake, 637 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (error to call
murder victim's widow solely to engender jury sympathy and prejudice the defendant).
In the ordinary course of a trial, otherwise relevant evidence often is excluded when its
inflammatory and prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.
117. Within these limits, however, the Court has indicated that it is desirable for the
jury to have as much information as possible. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 153, 203-04
(1976).
118. Id. at 206-07.
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rectly related to the defendant and the offense, may result in arbi-
trary, capricious, constitutionally offensive sentencing.
The Maryland VIS places before the sentencing jury an almost
open-ended invitation to consider a wide variety of prejudicial infor-
mation, subject to no real checks or guidelines. Despite its clearly
aggravating nature and formalistic mode of presentation,' " 9 the VIS
has not even'been accorded the status of a statutory aggravating fac-
tor, subject to at least some legislative direction. °2 0 Although the
Court did not have to reach the issue, it is highly questionable
whether this type of victim impact evidence, even if recast into a
different statutory form, ever could function as a constitutionally ac-
ceptable aggravating factor. Such factors must narrow the class of
those who are eligible to receive capital punishment and reasonably
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence. t 2' The Court has
previously invalidated sentencing schemes which feature aggravat-
ing factors that are subject to overbroad interpretation. 22 Victim
impact evidence contains these flaws to a marked degree. 2 3 In any
event, the use of victim impact evidence is fraught with evidentiary
and procedural pitfalls, particularly when a jury is the sentencing
authority. It has no place in the death penalty calculus.
A genuine question exists, however, as to what ramifications the
Court's decision has on the use of victim impact evidence in general.
119. As the Court noted, there is a very real danger that a VIS prepared by the DPP
will be construed by. the jury as representing the views of the State. 107 S. Ct. at 2536
n. 11. In addition, there is an inherent problem of accuracy when such information is
filtered through the DPP; this is compounded when, as here, the writer of the report
adds additional commentary. See id. ("[T]he writer concluded that the crimes had a
'shocking, painful and devast[atling' effect on the family, and that 'lilt is doubtful that
they will ever be able to fully recover.' "). Yet suggestions that victim impact statements
be subjected to some form of corroboration have generally been rejected. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Bachman, 92 Ill. App. 3d 419, 425, 414 N.E.2d 1369, 1374 (1981) (dismissing
defendant's claims that victim's statement concerning nightmares and other emotional
trauma be corroborated by a physician).
120. 107 S. Ct. at 2533. See supra note 33.
121. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
122. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U'S. 420, 429 (1980) (plurality) (aggravating
circumstance that the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman"
invalidated as overbroad).
123. Victim impact evidence also poses capital sentencing problems beyond those
considered by the Court. Many state capital sentencing schemes require appellate re-
view of the proportional propriety of each death sentence award. In Maryland, for ex-
ample, the Court of Appeals must determine whether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime
and the defendant. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 413-14 (1987). The injection of such a
highly arbitrary and ambiguous factor into the proportionality calculus, absent clear di-
rections or guidelines, may render the review meaningless.
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The Court was careful to note that its holding was "guided by the
fact that death is a 'punishment different from all other sanc-
tions.' 124 Sentencing considerations may be different in a noncap-
ital context.M Indeed, the opinion noted that the majority of states
and Congress permit the use of victim impact evidence in some con-
texts.' 26 Facially, such noncapital sentencing schemes are unaf-
fected by Booth.' 27
If Booth truly had turned on circumstances unique to capital
sentencing, this conclusion would remain valid. The basis for the
Court's opinion, and the methodology adopted to reach its conclu-
sion, however, do not permit such a limited reading.
The Court identified very real procedural and evidentiary con-
cerns in the use of victim impact evidence. These concerns arguably
are valid in the noncapital situation and will be discussed below.
But even if, arguendo, problems of strategic weakness, inflammatory
and distracting nature, and unfairness are somehow "cured" by the
normal noncapital situation of a judge performing the sentencing
role, ' 28 the valid philosophic objections voiced by the Court remain.
The Court did not approach the question of the use of the VIS
in Booth with the same methodology it has used to tackle similar
eighth amendment problems. In Gregg v. Georgia,'2 9 the first of the
124. 107 S. Ct. at 2536 n.12 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-
04, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, I.)).
125. See id. at 2535 n.10.
126. Id. at 2536 n.12. See, e.g., FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(c)(2)(c). As noted above, however,
the format and content of the victim impact evidence permitted by other states are very
similar to Maryland's VIS. See supra note 28. For a synopsis of each state's victim impact
legislation, see the Appendix infra at 733.
127. But as the Court itself previously has noted in an eighth amendment context, "a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). Nevertheless, those courts
which have considered victim impact evidence since Booth have applied the holding nar-
rowly. See, e.g., Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1987) (not applicable
when death sentence based on jury recommendation, not verdict); Tibbs v. State, 72
Md. App. 239, 258 n.6, 528 A.2d 510, 519 n.6 (1987) (only applicable in a capital con-
text); State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 358 S.E.2d I (1987) (finding that harmless error
exists when prosecutor merely alludes to victim's and family's rights under the law);
State v. Post, 32 Ohio St. 3d 380, 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987) (distinguishing Ohio statutory
victim impact scheme); State v. Bell, 360 S.E.2d 706 (S.C. 1987) (relating the use of
victim impact evidence in the situation at bar more directly to the circumstances of the
crime). But see Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987) (using Booth to
exclude evidence leading to arbitrariness offered by the defense).
128. Maryland, for example, has accorded the noncapital sentencing judge "virtually
boundless discretion" in conducting the sentencing proceeding. Logan v. State, 289
Md. 460, 480, 425 A.2d 632, 647 (1981). See also Smith v. State, 308 Md. 162, 517 A.2d
1081 (1986).
129. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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quartet of cases reinstating the death penalty after Furman, a plural-
ity of the Court held that an evaluation of a given punishment's con-
stitutionality under the "cruel and unusual" clause of the eighth
amendment requires "an assessment of contemporary values con-
cerning the infliction of a challenged sanction."' 30 This assessment
then is compared to the subject punishment to determine whether it
has been imposed in a way that offends "public perceptions of stan-
dards of decency."''I The Court traditionally has focused on "ob-
jective factors" as a clear indication of contemporary values,
conducting a survey of state jurisdictions to properly evaluate the
"unusualness" of a given practice or value.' 3 2 As a plurality of the
Court noted in Woodson. v. North Carolina,. "legislative measures
adopted by the people's chosen representatives weigh heavily in as-
certaining contemporary standards of decency."' 3 3 In Gregg, for ex-
ample, this type of examination permitted the Court to conclude
that society still considered the death penalty a viable sentencing
option.'34 In Coker v. Georgia 135 the Court used this jurisdictional
survey to demonstrate the "unusualness" of the death penalty as a
punishment for rape. These examinations have continued to be a
hallmark of Supreme Court forays into multijurisdictional eighth
amendment pronouncements. 3 6 Most recently, in Enmund S7 and
Tison,' 3 8 the Court employed this mode of analysis in determining
the constitutionality of capital sentencing for various permutations
of felony murder.
In Booth the situation seemed ripe for such an examination. At
least thirty-six states and the federal government have incorporated
130. Id. at 173 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.).
131. Id.
132. The Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence is replete with examples of this
type of determination, examining legislative enactments as "objective factors" to ensure
that a given punishment comports with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See, e.g., Tison
v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1685-86 (1981); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93
(severity analysis of other jurisdictions allowing capital punishment for felony murder);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295 (1976) (mandatory death penalties);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 n.36 (death penalty for death that occurs during the course of a
robbery); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584. 593-96 (1977) (plurality) (death penalty for
rape).
133. 428 U.S. at 294-95.
134. 428 U.S. at 179-80.
135. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
136. See supra note 132.
•137. 458 U.S. at 789.
138. 107 S. Ct. at 1685-86.
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victim impact evidence into their sentencing procedures.' 3 9 Yet
only in a footnote at the end of its opinion did the Court acknowl-
edge the widespread use of this type of evidence at sentencing.,
40
Even if the Court chose not to employ its traditional analysis, at the
very least this legislative mandate argued compellingly for an opin-
ion that did not reject victim impact information per se, but that was
drawn narrowly within the confines of procedural concerns unique
to the capital process. The Court, however, did not limit its ration-
ale to the very real procedural flaws inherent when victim impact
information is introduced to the capital sentencing jury. Instead,
the Court leaped into an examination of the very nature of victim
impact evidence. With this examination the Court implicitly asked
whether victim impact evidence ever can properly reflect on a de-
fendant's culpability for the purposes of criminal punishment. The
Court's rejection of victim impact evidence may not be constitution-
ally determinative at noncapital proceedings; at the very least, how-
ever, it is philosophically damning.
V. VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE GENERALLY
The Booth opinion'illustrates two types of flaws inherent in vic-
tim impact evidence. One of the flaws is substantive; the other is
procedural. Both have application outside of the capital sphere;
both have attendant constitutional concerns.
A. Substantive Problems
Substantively, Booth rejected the use in sentencing of evidence
which is unrelated to the culpability of the defendant. More pie-
cisely, the Court excluded a crime's ramifications upon the victim
and his or her family, unforeseeable at the time of the offense, from
the definition of the term "circumstances of the crime." This ex-
cluded information does not relate to the moral culpability of the
capital offender. It is illogical that it should relate to a greater de-
gree to the moral culpability of the noncapital offender.
It is clear that in some respects capital and noncapital sentenc-
ing are dissimilar. The Court has spoken often and at length about
the uniqueness of death and the heightened need for greater indicia
of reliability in the sentencing process.' 4 ' The converse is not nec-
139. 107 S. Ct. at 2536 n.12.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). But see Spaziano
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461-62 (1984) (discussing points of similarity between capital
and noncapital sentencing).
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essarily true, however. All indicia of reliability are not jettisoned in
noncapital adjudication, nor are all questions of intent and moral
culpability eliminated. If they were, the judicial system would be
one of strict criminal liability. The differences between capital and
noncapital procedures principally are questions of degree, not of in-
tegral values. The fundamental nature of the criminal process re-
mains the same, whether-the anticipated punishment is death or a
less severe sentence. As the Court stated in Spaziano v. Florida,'42
"despite its unique aspects, a capital sentencing proceeding involves
the samefundamental issue involved in any other sentencing pro-
ceeding-a determination of the appropriate punishment to be im-
posed on an individual."' 4 3
Indeed, the Court continually draws on fundamentals of crimi-
nal law to interpret the constitutionality of capital sentencing
schemes.' 44 Although the "scrutiny" may be stricter in capital
cases, the Court's identification of these essential individual ele-
ments of our criminal system nonetheless is valid. When this analy-
sis speaks to core values and principles that are not unique to the
capital process, the Court is highly persuasive. When the analysis
pertains to constitutional safeguards protecting these principles, the
Court is controlling.
Sentencing based on individual moral culpability is one of these
fundamental values. The concept of "individualized" sentencing is
not unique to capital proceedings and has long been accepted in
this country. 14 5 Every sentencing decision not encompassing ad-
ministrative or minor strict liability offenses involves the weighing of
appropriate factors under the rubric of proper sentencing goals.
Criminal sentencing, the Booth court implied, always will focus on
the measure of moral blameworthiness of the defendant. That is
what should trigger society's wrath, and that is precisely the type of
analysis obfuscated by the majority of victim impact evidence.
This concern is highlighted, by negative inference, by the gen-
eral thrust of the dissent's argument. Justice White's response to
the procedural flaws perceived by the majority in the use of victim
impact evidence was perfunctory. Justice Scalia did not address it.
142. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
143. Id. at 459.
144. See, e.g. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 458-59 (role of judge and jury in sentencing); En-
mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-99 (1982) (role of intentional conduct).
145. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
602 (1978) (plurality). See also California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 841 (1987)
(O'ConnorJ., concurring); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-49 (1949); Penn-
sylvania e ret Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 53 (1937).
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Instead, both centered their arguments on the correlation of victim
impact evidence to moral blame, for the majority's use of this line of
reasoning dealt the fatal blow to the legal utility of the VIS. Proce-
dural flaws can be remedied, new techniques devised, cases factually
distinguished, legislative safe harbors provided. If moral culpability
is the touchstone, if sentencing information must relate, however
tangentially, to the "blackness" of the defendant's "soul,"'1 4 6 then
the utility of the VIS in any context is suspect.
The focus of the VIS is undoubtedly on the victim, not the de-
fendant. Submitting the information it contains to a sentencing au-
thority can serve no other purpose than to act as an aggravating
factor injected into the punishment calculus. If this type of informa-
tion further defines the harm caused by the defendant, as the dis-
senters maintain, then the culpable consequences of a crime are
extended beyond foreseeable limits and bear no relation to moral
blame. In this situation, the punishment scale is calibrated by the
victim, not the defendant.' 47
The amorphous nature of the various components of victim im-
pact evidence ensures that such a scale is at best uncertain and unre-
liable.. But perhaps the most potent indictment of victim impact
evidence is evident in the Court's process of categorization. This
produces the bottom line-what additional factors increase the de-
fendant's punishment. Through the VIS, the state introduces a
myriad of information into the sentencing system, each discrete item
deemed relevant by legislative imprimatur, and each item poten-
tially, even if only incrementally, an aggravating factor.
The personal characteristics of the victim are a prime example.
Is injury to a rich, successful, loving head of a family more deserving
of punishment than injury to a poor, vagrant orphan? Apart from
the procedural difficulties associated with the introduction of such
information, 4 ' is this ever a principled sentencing distinction? The
146. See Bums, From Botany Bay to Booth: Defendants, Victims and Justice, 20 MD. BARJ. 2,
3 (1987) (the author was the Maryland assistant public defender who represented Booth
before the Supreme Court).
147. That is not to say that the sentencing authority does not always consider, at least
subjectively, victim impact information. Of course, by the same token a sentencing au-
thority always will mentally entertain a variety of elements, including mercy. The sub-
jective thought processes of the sentencing authority can be channeled to some extent-
by sentencing guidelines, for example-without significantly jeopardizing the intuitive
discretion that is the historical hallmark of the criminal sentencing system. When an
expanded version of victim impact information is formalized and then submitted to the
sentencing authority in a manner calculated to inspire deference, a new component is
added to the process, tipping the previous subjective balance.
148. See supra Part III(B) and infra Part V(B).
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Court has stated unequivocally that it is not.
A sliding scale of victim worth is offensive to our values as a
society. It is no less offensive when applied in a non-capital context.
"In a Nation committed to equal protection of the law, there is no
permissible 'caste' aspect of law enforcement."'' 49  Sentencing
under this rubric, judged by normal judicial standards, cannot help
being arbitrary.
The question then becomes whether a legislature may ascribe
an aggravating role to victim impact evidence in a noncapital pun-
ishment scheme when it concededly does not further an accepted
sentencing goal and reflects victim distinctions that are offensive to
the democratic norms of our society. As the Gregg plurality noted, a
sanction cannot be so totally without penological justification that it
results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.'5 0  Although the
Booth Court was careful to limit its opinion to capital sentencing situ-
ations, the reasoning employed by the Court leaves little doubt as to
how, on policy grounds, it would answer the question.
Policy and philosophy, however persuasive when enunciated by
the Nation's highest court, in the end do not control lower courts'
decisions. The more compelling question is whether sentencing in-
fluenced by victim impact evidence is constitutionally offensive.
Criminal sentencing, if conducted using unprincipled methods and
conforming to no legitimate sentencing goal, is by its very definition
arbitrary and capricious. In constitutional terms, such punishment
may be "cruel and unusual," violating the eighth amendment. The
historical background of the eighth amendment reveals particular
concern over the establishment of safeguards against any arbitrary
punishment.' 5 ' Admittedly, the Court has been reluctant to expand
eighth amendment jurisprudence beyond the confines of the death
penalty.' 5 2 Yet the eighth amendment takes its measure not from
precedent, but from the "evolving standards of decency that mark
149. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). Discuss-
ing the discriminatory application of the death penalty, Justice Douglas drew an analogy
to ancient Hindu law, where punishment increased in severity as social status dimin-
ished. Id.
150. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976).
151. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted'" The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 852-60 (1969). The language of the eighth amendment was
drawn from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. The English statute was concerned pri-
marily with the selective or irregular application of harsh penalties. Furman, 408 U.S. at
242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
152. But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (life sentence without parole held
significantly disproportionate to the crime and therefore unconstitutional).
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the progress of a maturing society. ' 53 Despite the current wide-
spread popularity of victim impact evidence, constitutional stan-
dards are not dependent on legislative definition. 154 In the Court's
view, enlightened sentencing mandates a focus on the individual de-
fendant's culpability. This focus precludes the consideration of the
type of evidence contained in the VIS. Considering the very potent
arguments raised by the Booth Court, it does not require a very
broad or expansive reading of the eighth amendment's require-
ments to find that noncapital sentencing utilizing victim impact evi-
dence violates the Constitution.
B. Procedural Problems
Given such general concerns, the more practical and perhaps
more immediate problems connected with noncapital victim impact
evidence are the procedural difficulties posed by its use. It has been
suggested that the reasoning in Booth is unique to the peculiar cir-
cumstances of a jury determined sentence. 5 5 Such circumstances,
however, do not pertain exclusively to capital sentencing. 5 6 And
though some concerns may be alleviated when the sentencing au-
thority is a judge, presumably more experienced and versed in the
ways of legal decisionmaking and less susceptible to emotionalism,
other problems remain.
The effectiveness of victim impact evidence is dependent on the
presence of an articulate, sympathetic victim or family. If it is not
presented through direct testimony, the persuasiveness of the evi-
dence also is dependent on the unchecked discretion of whoever
prepares the reports. The possible discriminatory effect is not miti-
gated when the crime is assault, not murder. Ascribing an aggravat-
153. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The eighth amendment is "not fastened
to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
154. "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barrette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943), quoted in Furman, 408 U.S. at
268 (Brennan, J., concurring).
155. See Monk, Do the Victims of Crime Have a Role to Play in CriminalJutice After Booth v.
Maryland?, 20 MD. BAR J. 6, 7 (1987) (the author, a deputy Maryland attorney general,
represented the State in Booth before the Supreme Court).
156. Although certainly not the usual circumstance, several states permit the jury to
determine the actual sentence for many noncapital offenses. Indeed, the Maryland legis-
lature has now provided for a jury determination of life or life without parole for certain
convicted first degree murderers. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1987). Interest-
ingly, this provision is devoid of any guidelines or channeling of the jury's discretion,
thus posing its own constitutional difficulties.
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ing character to any offense based on the characteristics and abilities
of the victim and the victim's family is not only philosophically ob-
jectionable, but procedurally unmanageable as well.'5 7
Problems of rebuttal remain. There is no practical way for the
defendant to refute most of the information contained in a VIS. A
claim that the defendant broke the victim's arm can be medically
verified; a claim of emotional trauma cannot. Due process seem-
ingly would permit the presentation of conflicting evidence, yet a
"minitrial on the victim's character" is no less odious in a noncapital
context.' 58 Because the "essence" of due process is "the right to a
fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations,"'"59 the
denial of such an opportunity, for whatever reason, is constitution-
ally troublesome.
Even if the sentencing authority is a judge, passion or ill will
should not sway the sentencing process. Yet that is the precise ef-
fect of victim impact information. Indeed, as noted above, victim
and family member opinion testimony and characterizations of the
crime serve no other purpose than to inflame and prejudice the sen-
tencing authority. Concern for the victim does not necessarily entail
subjecting a sentencing judge to impassioned pleas for
vengeance.'60
Fundamental fairness and due process require any sentencing
process to abide by certain basic procedural safeguards. The intro-
duction of victim impact evidence significantly handicaps the crimi-
nal defendant in the search for fair and impartial sentencing. Given
the dubious probative value of such information, this handicap may
prove so unfairly detrimental that it reaches constitutional
proportions.
This result is unfortunate in many ways. There is no question
that the treatment of victims within the criminal justice system can
be much improved. The victims' rights movement has made great
strides in promoting community awareness of the plight of crime
victims. Yet the pendulum can swing too far. Engrafting an atavistic
157. Some victims' rights advocates argue for an even more intrusive role for the vic-
tim at sentencing, demanding that victims, as well as criminals, be accorded "elementary
due process," including notice and the opportunity to be heard. Hudson, The Crime
Victim and the Criminal Justice System, 1I PEPPERDINE L. REv. 23, 36 (1984) (Symposium
Special Issue).
158. See Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2535.
159. Chambers v. Missouri, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
160. See, e.g., People v. McCarthy, 519 N.Y.S.2d 118, 119 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987) (limiting
crime victim to written statement submitted to sentencing judge, as oral presentation
could "becloud the judicial atmosphere").
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system of private prosecution onto the criminal process does not
enhance any legitimate societal objective, unless one includes pri-
vate vengeance and retaliation.' 6 ' A formalized role for the victim
at sentencing, no matter what its specific form, detracts from the
sentencing authority's focus on the defendant and imperils the very
concept of individualized sentencing. 62 It is alnost certainly unen-
lightened; it may be unconstitutional as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Booth v. Maryland the Supreme Court for the first time con-
fronted the use of victim impact evidence in criminal -sentencing.
The Court conclusively determined that the use of this type of evi-
dence was constitutionally impermissible in death penalty proceed-
ings. Instead of focusing exclusively on the very real' procedural
flaws in the use of such information before a capital sentencing jury,
the Court examined the very nature of victim impact evidence, hold-
ing it irrelevant to questions of criminal culpability. In addition, the
Court found the Maryland Victim Impact Statement procedurally
troublesome, inflammatory, and overly prejudicial. Although the
Court's holding is factually and textually limited to the capital sen-
tencing context, the reasoning and methodology employed by the
Court cast a serious pall over the future of victim impact evidence in
the American criminal justice system.' 63
CHARLTONT. HOWARD III
161. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (re-
jecting private vengeance and retaliation as proper goals of punishment).
162. The majority of state victim statutes provide for the introduction at sentencing of
information similar or identical to that contained in the Maryland VIS. See supra note 28;
Appendix infra at 733. Of course, there is nothing to stop a jurisdiction from going
beyond the strict language of its statute and, based on legislative intent, adopting an
even more expansive role for victim impact evidence. See, e.g., Lodowski v. State, 302
Md. 691, 748-49, 490 A.2d 1228, 1254-55 (1985) (allowing victim to make oral as well as
written statement, though not specifically permitted in statute). But see McCarthy, 519
N.Y.S.2d at 119 (murder victim's family not entitled to make oral statement at sentenc-
ing, limited to written VIS). Indeed, certain victims' rights proponents advocate an even
more substantial sentencing role than indicated by the majority of the legislation de-
scribed in the Appendix, including a return to private prosecution, see Goldstein, Defining
the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515, 558-61 (1982), and even. a
constitutional amendment, see PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIM OF CRIME, FINAL RE-
PORT 114 (Dec. 1982) (recommending amending the sixth amendment to include the
words: "Likewise, the victim in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to be
present and to be heard at all critical stages ofjudicial proceedings."). Seegenerally Abra-
hamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims' Rights Movement. 1985 UTAH L. REV. 517.
163. This shadow would dissipate rapidly if the changing composition of the Court
alters its capital sentencing philosophy. Booth was a 5-4 decision, with Justice Powell,
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since retired, in the majority. The dissent's view of the role of victim impact evidence
may gain the adherence of Justice Kennedy, giving it a majority.
The Supreme Court recently decided another Maryland death penalty case, Mills v.
Maryland, 108 S.Ct. 1860 (1988). Mills had been sentenced to death for killing his
prison cellmate. The issues raised on appeal included the consideration of victim impact
evidence contained in a memorandum submitted to the sentencing jury. See Mills v.
State, 310 Md. 33, 527 A.2d 3 (1987). The memorandum contained information con-
cerning the personal and criminal history of Mills' victim. The Court, in a 5-4 decision,
held unconstitutional the sentencing form used by the jury to convict Mills, since the
form did not make adequate provision for the consideration of mitigating factors. The
majority, therefore, did not reach the issue of victim impact evidence. The dissent
(Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy) commented that
the type of evidence considered in Mills was not within the scope of Booth. The dissent-
ers also registered their disagreement with the basic tenets of the Booth decision. 108
S.Ct. at 1876. It is significant in terms of the future course of victim impact jurispru-
dence that Justice Kennedy joined this dissent.
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APPENDIX
SYNOPSES OF OTHER VICTIM IMPACT STATUTES
Alaska - ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.022 (1984).
A victim impact statement is prepared as part of the
presentence report on every felony offender by a probation officer.
The statement contains:
(1) financial, emotional, and medical effects on the victim;
(2) the victim's need for restitution; and
(3) any other information required by the court.
Arizona - ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-253(4) (Supp. 1986).
The presentence report lists the physical, emotional, and finan-
cial impact on the immediate family. The victim or immediate fam-
ily has the right to appear personally or by counsel at any
aggravation or mitigation hearing.
California - CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(h) (Supp. 1987).
A convicted felon's probation (presentence) report will include
a statement of the victim's comments concerning the offense. The
court may direct the probation officer not to obtain the victim's
comments when the victim previously has testified in the trial.
Colorado - COL. REV. STAT. § 16-11-102 (1986).
The presentence report for a felony offender (except for capital
offenses) will include a victim impact statement prepared by the dis-
trict attorney's office using information supplied by the department.
of social services. The VIS may include the following:
(1) an identification of the victim;
(2) the victim's economic loss;
(3) the victim's physical injuries;
(4) a description of any change in the victim's personal wel-
fare or familial relationships as a result of the offense;
(5) any requests for psychological services by the victim or the
victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(6) any other information related to the impact of the offense
upon the victim that the court requires.
Connecticut - CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-91a(c) (1985).
A probation officer in preparing a presentence report will in-
quire into the attitude of the victim, or in case of homicide the im-
mediate family, as to the crime and any damages suffered by the
victim, including medical expenses, loss of earnings, and property
loss. The crime victim has the right to testify at the sentencing
hearing.
Florida - FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.143 (1985).
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If the defendant pleads guilty to a crime or is convicted of a
felony, the victim (or next of kin if the victim has died as a result of
the crime) may make an oral or written statement to the sentencing
court relating solely to the facts of the -case and the extent of any
harm, including social, psychological, physical, or financial harm,
suffered as a result of the crime.
Indiana - IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-8 & -9 (Burns 1985 & Supp.
1986).
The presentence investigation will include a written statement
of the victim as to the sentence and the acceptance of any recom-
mendation. If desired, a probation officer will reduce the victim's
oral statements to writing.
Iowa - IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.3 (Supp. 1986).
The presentence report will include the harm to the victim, the
victim's immediate family, and the community. Additionally, the
victim has an opportunity to complete a victim impact statement to
be included in the report.
Kansas - KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4604(2) (Supp. 1985).
The presentence report (discretionary for misdemeanor,
mandatory for felony) will include information as to the attitude of
the complainant or victim, or the victim's immediate family in cases
of homicide.
Louisiana - LA. REV. STAT. 46:1844(9) (Supp. 1986).
The statutory section is entitled "Basic Rights for Victim." Pro-
visions include the opportunity for a felony victim to make an oral
or written VIS at sentencing and pardon or parole.,hearings. The
VIS will include:
(1) the name of the victim;
(2) the net financial loss; and
(3) a statement of the psychological impact on the victim's
personal welfare or family relationships. Family members of homi-
cide victims are accorded all the rights of a victim under the statute.
Maine - ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1257 (Supp. 1987).
A victim of any crime shall, on request, have the right to -ad-
dress the sentencing court. If unwilling or unable to appear, the
victim may submit a written statement.
Massachusetts - MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 4B (Supp. 1988).
A victim of any noncapital felony has the right to make an oral
or written statement to the sentencing court concerning the impact
of the crime and any recommended sentence. If unable to make a
statement due to mental, emotional or physical incapacity, or age,
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the victim's attorney or a designated family member may do so. In
addition, the district attorney will file a statement identifying the vic-
tim, the net financial loss of the victim and the victim's family caused
by the crime, any psychological impact on the victim and the victim's
family, and any impact on the victim's personal welfare or family
relationship. The defendant will be given the opportunity to rebut
any oral or written statement.
Minnesota - MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.115 lb, 611A.031, 611A.
037 (Supp. 1987).
Misdemeanor presentence investigations may, and felony
presentence investigations shall, include a VIS detailing:
(1) a summary of the damages or harm and any other
problems generated by the criminal occurrence;
(2) a concise statement of what disposition the victim deems
appropriate for the defendant or juvenile court respondent, includ-
ing any reasons given by the victim in support of the victim's posi-
tion; and
(3) any written objections to any proposed disposition of the
offender.
Minnesota also provides for victim input into a prosecutorial
decision to channel an offender into a pretrial diversion program.
Montana - MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-112 (1987).
The presentence investigation will include an inquiry by the
probation officer into the harm caused to the victim, the victim's
immediate family, and the community.
Nebraska - NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2261 (1985).
The presentence report for a felony offender will include any
written statements submitted to the probation officer by the victim.
The probation officer must certify that he or she has attempted to
contact the victim to solicit a statement, including offering to tran-
scribe a victim's oral statement.
Nevada - NEv. REV. STAT. § 176.145 (1986).
The presentence report for a felony offender will contain infor-
mation concerning the effect on the victim, including but not limited
to, any physical or psychological harm or financial loss suffered by
the victim. The extent of the information included is solely at the
discretion of the department of parole and probation.
New Jersey - N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-6.b (Supp. 1987).
The presentence report may include a statement by the victim.
The VIS may include the nature and extent of physical, psychologi-
cal, and emotional harm or trauma, the extent of any loss to include
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loss of earnings or ability to work, and the effect of the crime on the
victim's family. The nearest relative of a homicide victim may make
the statement.
New York - N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30(3b) (Supp. 1987).
The presentence report should contain, when "relevant," an
analysis of the victim's version of the offense, the extent of injury or
economic loss or damage, and the amount of restitution requested.
In the case of homicide or incapacity, the information may be ac-
quired from the victim's family.
Ohio - Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.051 (Supp. 1985).
In all felony cases involving the infliction of physical harm, a
VIS will be prepared by the probation officer, a victim assistance
program, or other governmental entity. The VIS will be considered
by the court at sentencing. The VIS shall identify:
(1) the victim;
(2) any economic loss;
(3) any physical injury;
(4) any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial rela-
tionships as a result of the offense;
(5) any psychological impact experienced by the victim or the
victim's family; and
(6) any other information related to the impact of the offense
that the court may require.
Oklahoma - OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 982 (1986).
The presentence investigation for noncapital felony offenders
shall include the voluntary statement of the victim concerning the
offense and the amount of the victim's loss.
Oregon - OR. REV. STAT. § 144.790(2), (4) (1985).
The presentence report shall include a statement by the victim
describing the effect of the offense on the victim.
Rhode Island - R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-4 to -4.3 (Supp. 1986).
Rhode Island has enacted a "Victim's Bill of Rights." Provisions
include the right to address the court during district court misde-
meanor pretrial conferences, all plea negotiations, and at sentenc-
ing concerning the impact of the crime. In homicide cases, or if the
victim is incapacitated, a member of the victim's immediate family
may exercise the victim's rights.
South Catolina - S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550 (1985).
The statute provides for a VIS in all noncapital cases involving a
victim, to be presented at the sentencing or probation hearing. The
statement may be presented orally or in writing, at the victim's op-
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tion. The victim desiring to make a written statement is assisted by
the state Victim Assistance Unit, utilizing a standard form developed
by the Attorney General's Office. The VIS will:
(1) identify the victim;
(2) itemize the victim's economic loss;
(3) identify the victim's physical and psychological injury;
(4) describe any changes in the victim's personal Welfare or
familial relationships as a result of the offense;
(5) identify any requests for psychological.,services by the vic-
tim or the victim's family; and
(6) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim.
Tennessee - TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-207(8), 40-35-209 (Supp.
1987).
A criminal presentence report will include any statement relat-
ing to sentencing submitted by the victim of the Offense or the inves-
tigative agency. At sentencing, the court may permit the victim or
the victim's family to testify.
Vermont - VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7006 (Supp. 1987).
The victim of a crime, or next of kin if the victim has died or
become incapacitated, has the right to appear personally at sentenc-
ing, and have the court consider his or heri views concerning the
crime, the person convicted, and the need for restitution.
Virginia - VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299.1 (Supp. 1987).
At the discretion of the court, when a felony offender has
caused significant physical, psychological, or economic injury to the
victim, a VIS will be included in the presentence report. It shall:
(1) identify the victim;
(2) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim;
(3) identify any physical or psychological injury suffered by
the victim;
(4) detail any change in the victim's personal welfare, lifestyle,
or familial relationships as a result of the offense;
(5) identify any request for psychological or medical services
initiated by the victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense;
and
(6) provide such other information as the court may require
related to the impact on the victim. Even if the court does not order
a VIS prepared, the prosecutor may do so on his or her own
initiative.
West Virginia - W. VA. CODE § 61-11 A-I to -7 (1984).
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Article 1 IA of the West Virginia Code contains the Victim Pro-
tection Act of 1984. Included in the Act are provisions for a felony
victim's right to testify at sentencing concerning the facts of the case
and the extent of any injuries or financial losses resulting from the
crime. In addition, all presentence investigations for crimes causing
physical, psychological, or economic injury will include a VIS. The
VIS will describe the nature and extent of any economic, physical, or
psychological injury suffered by the -victim, the details of any
changes in the victim's personal welfare, lifestyle, or family relation-
ships resulting from the offense, any requests for psychological or
medical services from the victim or the victim's family, and any other
information that the court may require.
Wisconsin - WIs. STAT. ANN. § 950.04(2m) (Supp. 1987).
Wisconsin has enacted an entire chapter entitled the "Rights of
Victims and Witnesses of Crime." Included in the chapter is a "ba-
sic bill of rights for victims and witnesses," providing, inter alia, that
a court will be provided with information relating to the economic,
physical, and psychological effect of the crime upon the victim of a
felony and that the information will be considered by the court.
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